@article{MAKHILLIBM2016102827067,
    title = {Does Management Entrenchment Explain Agency Costs of Equity:
Evidence from French Firms},
    journal = {International Business Management},
    volume = {10},
    number = {28},
    pages = {6349-6360},
    year = {2016},
    issn = {1993-5250},
    doi = {ibm.2016.6349.6360},
    url = {https://makhillpublications.co/view-article.php?issn=1993-5250&doi=ibm.2016.6349.6360},
    author = {Kouki,Mondher and},
    keywords = {Agency costs,managerial entrenchment,ownership structure,free cash flow,dual},
    abstract = {The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of the management entrenchment on the agency
costs of equity. We conduct tests on 120 French companies over the period 200-2014 in order to test the impact
of the main factors that can intensify the conflicts between shareholders and managers. We use three
alternative measures of agency costs of equity, namely asset utilization, operating expenses and administrative
expenses. According to the empirical results, the CEO age, his dual role of executive and chairman and the
discrepancy between ownership and voting rights are relevant determinants of agency conflicts between
shareholders and managers. Furthermore, we find that, the manager’s seniority and his ownership constitute
internal governance mechanisms for the French companies.}
    }