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The Economic Calculus of War, Defense and Military Alliances: The Case of Israeli-Iranian Cold-Military Confrontation

[1]Sheriff G. Ibrahim, [1]Sadeeque A. Abba and [2]Musa M. Adams
[1]Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Abuja, Abuja, Nigeria
[2]Department of Sociology, Huazhong Normal University, P.R. China

Abstract: The vulnerability and feebleness of the political and economic circles of nation-states empirically tally with the analogy of the school of realism in international politics. This study, however delves into the economics of war, defense and military alliances within the framework of global politics and economy. The study analyses the expenditure and finances of defense and military industrial complex among international political blocs, allies and regional or continental cooperative interdependent movements. The results of finding show that Iran and Israel are in one of the most dangerous cold military confrontation in contemporary international politics. The study concludes that due to the nature of Israeli American alliance, it is unequivocally difficult for Iran to win in a period of active war or conflict. The study recommends balance of power, disarmament and two state solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict among other things.

Key words: Economic calculus, war, defense, military alliance, confrontation, continental

INTRODUCTION

The anarchic nature of international political atmosphere validates the theoretical gesticulations of realism having nations against nations, states dominating states, the occupation of super power vacuum or the desire to be considered powerful by other states. These are peculiar features of man as an individual and state as a sovereign entity. This is not unconnected with the analogy of actors in both state and systemic politics. It is also not doubtful that the behaviors of individuals shape the policies and politics of a state and extends to the foreign policy of that particular state as it relates with the rest of the world. This also brings us to the question of political alliance which extends to constructivist submissions of why states consider others as potential foes and why others as allies seen with common identity. This will explain the political chemistry that shapes international political, economic and military alliances. It also asks the question of why Italy despite her support to France, Mussolini turned to support the axis (Germany in particular) during the 2nd world war. Why Russia also fought side in side with the allied powers to bring Hitler down and have the control over East Germany? It also raises the question of why Russia and China back anti American political regimes such as Iran, Venezuela Cuba, etc., and why America supports states such as Israel, providing them with weapons and financial support for military expansionism and defense system? The cost and benefit of calculations of war is fundamental to be considered by any state which tries to wage war against other states with the purpose of hegemony, expansionism, colonialism, etc., what would be the outcome of global peace for example if Israel dares to attack Iran? The question also goes vice-versa. What kind of alliance would be raised when there is war between the two countries? What if Iran is attacked by the United States of America? What could be the damage, the implications and bearing to future global economy? Without the support of external power like the United States could Iran fight its war? Albeit, Israel assumed victory during her war with the Arabs when it was nearly defeated by the Arabs in 1973, it immediately got support from the US in military hardware supplies which reversed the course of the war. But without such support can Israel fight the war alone? Who could be behind Iran when the so called war incepts? In this case, however Reuveny is of the view that:

> In the absence of massive US assistance, Israel's military resources may quickly dwindle, forcing it to use its alleged nuclear weapons as it had reportedly almost done in 1973. Russia and China might rearm their injured Iranian protege overnight just as Nixon rearmed Israel and threaten to intervene, just as the USSR threatened to join Egypt and Syria in 1973. President Obama's response would likely put US forces on nuclear alert, replaying Nixon's nightmarish scenario

Corresponding Author: Sheriff G. Ibrahim, Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Abuja, Abuja, Nigeria

Notwithstanding, many scholars and analysts perceived the gulf war as a watershed or a roadmap to the 3rd world war. But it has ended in the invasion of Iraq and finally regime change which factors were seen as necessitated by the September 11 attack on the World Trade Centre.

But critics believed that the invasion of Iraq was far planned even before the attack due to UN non-support to the war. What is notable here is that in the emergence of neo-multipolarism, the US hegemonic power is gradually crippling.

The fear of Israel, however is that Iran must not be allowed to possess nuclear weapons even if it has, it must be denuclearized. According to Reuveny when US vice president Joe Biden sat with Israel's prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu before a dinner at the prime minister's residence in Jerusalem on March 9, Biden assured Israel of Washington's commitment preventing Iran from producing nuclear weapons. This has resulted in the subsequent sanctions imposed on Iran after the votes by members of the United Nations (predominantly pro US).

MATERIALS AND METHODS

This study is built from the relevance of secondary methodological research, exploring library data from authored materials such as books, journals, periodicals, newspapers, magazines, government reports and others. It is purely a qualitative research based on analytical and descriptive conclusions.

The study is also supported by theoretical elucidation which explains the general insecurity of the global system. The school of realism is without doubt, prominent in providing clear explanations on how and why the world is anarchic the way it portrays itself. The school of thought is all about power politics, balance of power, anarchy, the national interest, the security dilemma, the concepts spring to mind all with their visual images and all rich with historical examples. It explains why state must acquire power (political, economic, military and weaponry) which is due to the absence of international order and government. When the great powers unleash fire, other states must create shock absorber to be able to withstand the challenge of power otherwise they can not exist within the unsecured global system.

The strong perpetuates his strength (the case of United States) while the weaker states strive to be stable. For the realists, Iran must fortify itself against any attack from Israel or America (just as Israel gets fortified against Hamas and Hezbollah).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The anarchic world: Anarchy is always referred to as a state of lack of popular authority to govern the international system, it is as captured by Lain (2007) and commonly understood that the nature of international politics is anarchy which simply means that there is no hierarchical global authority which can establish and maintain regulation to create order in international affairs. Scholars also agree that struggle for power among states results in an unexpected anarchy. Morgenthou believes that international politics is struggle for power hence there is every tendency for anarchy as states do not allow domination of any kind against their sovereignty. This assertion is not unconnected with a realist position of the systemic polity. Mearsheimer has designated the nature of the international system when he argues:

> That the international system is anarchic. Second, states inherently possess some offensive military capabilities. Third, states can never be certain about intention of other states. Forth, most basic motive driving states is survival. Five, states are rational actor which think strategically. These five assumptions dictate the behavior of the state in following way; state fear each other; each state aims to guarantee its own survival and states aim to maximize their power

Some discourses on international anarchy are quiet contradictory: Some of the writers of history, especially on European civil wars and anarchy fall under this category. They have failed to disentangle federation from confederation at the global level. For example, Lipgens and Loth (1988) are of the argument that one can not expect to create a world government on a federal basis to day because the different continents of the world are at different stages of political education and political thought. This assertion is rather obnoxious because it serves as an aberration to fundamental freedom of man which is to argue all states can not earn their freedom and sovereignty just because they have different stages of political education and thought?

Lipgens and Loth (1988) proposed international dictatorship at a political and economic sphere of international politics which will make sovereign states bend due to the super power imposed on them. They are of the opinion that international anarchy is incompatible with peace and that in the common interest, there must be recognition of an international authority superior to the individual states and endowed not only with rights over them but with power to make them effective, operating not only in the political but in the economic sphere.

If confederation can not work at the systemic level due to the anarchic nature of the international system why federal framework is also not workable? Lipgens and Loth (1988) misinterpreted international federalism and accepted dictatorship as the way out. Sovereignty can not be completely taken from independent states there is always a centre in a federation which allows every component to operate according to the constitution but allows some exclusive rights to the centre.

Some scholars of international politics have presumed the demise of realism after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This is primarily because realism is one of the major theoretical instruments that explain the nature of global insecurity and vulnerability of the whole system. Brown and Lynn-Jones (1995) are of the opinion that the end of the cold war was accompanied by a rush to proclaim the failure of realism as a theory of international politics.

One of the major set back to traditional realism is defensive realism which explains that states can survive without being aggressive but by adopting defensive strategies to survive. As maintained by Brown and Lynn-Jones (1995), defensive realists argue that aggressive foreign policies are the result of domestic political pathologies (fervent nationalism and unstable ruling elites). They also see aggressive realism as a production of global insecurity due to its anarchic nature; aggressive realists contend that the pressures of an anarchic and unpredictable international system, sadly make the adoption of aggressive foreign policies perfectly rational.

The Israeli's war experience with Arabs: Four major wars were fought between Israel and Arab nations. These major wars are; 1948 War of Independence, 1956 Sinai war, 1967 Six Days war and 1973 Yom Kippur war (the Ramadan war). The land of Palestine was apparently made to be a focus after European persecution of the Jews. The Arabs also had to bear the burden become the victims of occupation and subjected to geographical inferiority. As the name implies, the 1948-49 war was fought in order to declare freedom and sovereignty of Israel on one hand while on the other to halt such movement which was seen as an occupation of the land of Palestine.

The United Nation organization had also contributed in its partitioning process which was not acceptable to the Arabs and later instigated an undeclared war. It was immediately after UN announcement of the partition that crises began which has been described in the words of Bard after the UN announcement. The Arabs declared a protest strike and instigated riots that claimed the lives of 62 Jews and 32 Arabs. By the end of the 2nd week,

Table 1: Arab states participation in the 1948 war of independence

State	Entry	Exit	Combat forces	Population	Losses
Egypt	1948	1949	3,00,000	350,00,000	2000
Israel	1948	1949	1,40,000	22,00,000	6000
Jordan	1948	1949	60,000	10,00,000	1000
Palestine	1948	1949	50,000	22,50,000	3000
Syria	1948	1949	3,00,000	60,00,000	1000

Armed conflict events data base, 2000

93 Arabs, 84 Jews and 7 British had been killed and scores were injured. As volunteers to the Arab side, Egypt, Syria, Jordan supported Palestine in order to ensure that the state of Israel was not a reality. Table 1 shows the nature of participation made by these states. Notwithstanding, the UN was determined to make the partition and process for Israeli independence, the Palestinians were not ready to accommodate such effort and they were resilient to deter any process leading to declaration of independence. It was on this fact that Bard reported:

> The UN blamed the Arabs for the violence. The UN Palestine Commission was never permitted by the Arabs or British to go to Palestine to implement the resolution. On February 16, 1948, the Commission reported to the Security Council; powerful Arab interests both inside and outside Palestine are defying the resolution of the General Assembly and are engaged in a deliberate effort to alter by force the settlement envisaged therein

The 1956 Sinai war: In this war, Britain France and Israel were all fighting Egypt at the same time due to the blockade made at Suez canal. Israel suffered navigation because Israeli ships found it difficult to pass by the canal; Asian ships were also deterred by the blockade and two major European powers (Britain and France) were both affected. In the writings of ADF (1999), the war started:

> In the early 1950s, Egypt violated the terms of the Egyptian-Israeli armistice agreement and blocked Israeli ships from passing through the Suez canal, a major international waterway. It also began to block traffic through the Straits of Tiran, a narrow passage of water linking the Israeli port of Eilat to the Red sea. This action effectively cut off the port of Eilat Israels' sole outlet to the Red sea and Indian ocean. Closure of the Suez canal and the Tiran straits damaged Israels' trade with Asia for it meant that foreign ships carrying goods bound for Israel and Israeli ships carrying goods bound for the Far East had to travel a long and costly circuitous route to the Atlantic and Israels' Mediterranean ports

It is also notable that Britain and France joined the war on the 29th of October 1956 after Egypt declared the nationalization of the Suez canal. The kadesh attack or what was known to be operation kadesh according to Jewish search became known from the ancient city of Kadesh, mentioned in the book of Deuteronomy, located in the Northern Sinai area. Israeli military planning for this operation in the Sinai hinged on four main military objectives; Sharm el-Sheikh, al-Arish, Abu Uwayulah and the Gaza strip. It was however, estimated that about 171 Israelis were killed, hundreds injured and 4 captured. While it was also estimated that that between 1500 and 3000 Egyptian soldiers were killed, thousands injured and 6000 prisoners. The Soviet Union was completely against the war; United States of America pioneered the move for disengagement. Nevertheless, one other aspect that gravitated Israel in to the war according to Eban (2010) was that:

> During the 6 years during which this belligerency has operated in violation of the Armistice Agreement [the Israel-Egypt Armistice Agreement signed February 24, 1949], there have occurred 1,843 cases of armed robbery and theft, 1,339 cases of armed clashes with Egyptian armed forces, 435 cases of incursion from Egyptian controlled territory, 172 cases of sabotage perpetrated by Egyptian military units and fedayeen in Israel. As a result of these actions of Egyptian hostility within Israel, 364 Israelis were wounded and 101 killed. In 1956 alone as a result of this aspect of Egyptian aggression, 28 Israelis were killed and 127 wounded

The 6 days war of 1967: It was clear that the Sinai war was a great impediment to regional peace in the Middle East hence, gravitated the deployment of UNEF. But Nasser of Egypt was resilient about fighting the state of Israel due to the nature of occupation and the general procedures of armistice which were not recognized by Arab states.

According to a radio-Cairo broadcast in 1967 in Egypt stated that the existence of Israel has continued too long. We welcome the Israeli aggression. We welcome the battle we have long awaited. The peak hour has come. The battle has come in which we shall destroy Israel. There was a pact between Nasser and Hussein of Jordan which allowed them to ally together. This was a veritable signal showing the inevitability of war. It is a tradition in the Middle East that whenever there is a war against Israel, many Arab states participate because it is seen as a holy war against Jewish occupation and terror. It is against this background that it was reported that:

> On May 14, Israeli intelligence noted that Nasser had moved considerable forces into the Sinai desert. On the same day, Egypt asked for withdrawal of the UNEF (United Nations emergency forces). When Hussein signed the pact with Nasser on May 30, it astounded the world indeed. Most especially, it astounded and alarmed Israeli military intelligence and the IDF general staff. The Nasser Hussein pact made war inevitable. Mobilization was expensive, diplomatic efforts were producing no results. In Israel, mobilization paralyzes the economy, since every able-bodied is removed from the work force (ZIED, 2010)

Table 2 shows the list of Arab countries with their various population size, territory and gross domestic product. In terms of armament, Israel had 275,000 troops (of which about 200,000 were reserves) 200 aircraft, 1,100 tanks. In another related literature, it was estimated that there were 250,000 troops, 192 combat aircraft, 40 trainers, 1100 tanks, 400 guns and heavy mortars.

On the other side, Arab forces totaled about 250,000 troops (not counting 50,000 in Yemen) 530 aircraft, 1,500 tanks (some sources claim 2,800 tanks), broken down as follows:

Table 2: The list of Arab countries with their various population size, territory and gross domestic product

Countries	Government	Territory (km^2)	Population (2001 est.)	GDP (Billions)
Arab total	Mostly monarchies	13,486,861	292,400,267	$1,195.49
Israel	Democracy	20,770	5,938,093	$110.20
Arabs>Israel		649 fold	49 fold	11 fold
Algeria	Republic	2,381,740	31,736,053	$171.00
Bahrain	Monarchy	620	645,361	$10.10
Comoros	Republic	2,170	596,202	$0.42
Djibouti	Republic	22,000	460,700	$0.57
Egypt	Republic	1,001,450	69,536,644	$247.00
Iraq	In transition	437,072	23,331,985	$57.00
Jordan	Monarchy	89,213	5,153,378	$17.30
Kuwait	Monarchy	17,820	2,041,961	$29.30
Lebanon	Republic	10,400	3,627,774	$18.20
Libya	Dictatorship	1,759,540	5,240,599	$45.40
Mauritania	Republic	1,030,700	2,747,312	$5.40
Morocco	Monarchy	446,550	30,645,305	$105.00
Oman	Monarchy	212,460	2,622,198	$19.60
Qatar	Monarchy	11,437	769,152	$15.10
Saudi Arabia	Monarchy	1,960,582	22,757,092	$232.00
Somalia	None	637,657	7,488,773	$4.30
Sudan	Military regime	2,505,810	36,080,373	$35.70
Syria	Military regime	185,180	16,728,808	$50.90
Tunisia	Republic	163,610	9,705,102	$62.80
UAE	Emirates	82,880	2,407,460	$54.00
Yemen	Republic	527,970	18,078,035	$14.40
Arab total	Mostly monarchies	13,486,861	292,400,267	$1,195.49
Israel total	Democracy	20,770	5,938,093	$110.20
Arabs>Israel		649 fold	49 fold	11 fold

Israel science and technology directory, 1999-2010; World fact book

Table 3: The 6 days war; air fight capabilty

Types	Israel	Egypt	Syria	Jordan	Iraq	Lebanon
Fighter	228	242	92	24	130	31
Bomber	19	57	2		21	
Transport	51	83	5	7	23	2
Helicopter	45	37	10	4	50	5
Total	343	419	109	35	224	38

Israel science and technology directory, 1999-2010; World fact book

Egypt: About 180,000 troops (of which 50,000 were deployed in Yemen. Some of these were returned to Sinai). About 420 aircraft of which 242 were MiG fighters and the rest were apparently, Ilyushin and Topolev bombers and Sukhoi fighter-bombers. About 900 tanks, 800 artillery pieces.

Jordan: About 56,000 troops, 24 Hawker-Hunter jet fighters, 294 tanks (including 30 Iraqi), 194 artillery pieces (including 34 Iraqi). Jordanian troops were reinforced with several Iraqi brigades.

Syria: About 70,000 troops, 92 fighter aircraft and 2 bombers, 300 tanks, 265 artillery pieces and heavy mortars (Morris, 1999) (Table 3).

The Ramadan war of October 1973: Prior to the outbreak of the war, several of diplomatic negotiations have taken place. Such negotiations include the UN mission of Gunnar Jarring (1968-71), the plan of Secretary of State William Rogers (1969-70) and President Sadat's initiative of early, 1971 (Bar-Joseph, 2006). According to Bar-Joseph (2006) however, Sadat's secret peace initiative of February, 1973 has until now received far less attention and yet in retrospect, it was probably the most important diplomatic proposal of the 1967-73 period. The peace initiative according to Quandt (2001) was important in five ways:

- Unlike the other initiatives in which the broker was either too weak (Jarring) or at least not strong enough (Rogers) here the go-between was Henry Kissinger, the architect of President Nixon's foreign policy who in early 1973 was at the height of his power
- The diplomatic route chosen by Sadat to pursue his initiative was secret Kissinger's backdoor channel which proved so, effective in facilitating the Vietnamese peace accord, the SALT agreements and the breakthrough with China. Opting for this route indicated that Sadat meant serious business rather than wanting to win propaganda points
- Third, the proposal itself was the first of its kind. It suggested not only a peace settlement between Israel and Egypt but also a comprehensive settlement of the Arab Israeli rivalry by ending the conflict between Israel and Syria, Jordan and the Palestinians because of the formula of peace including normalization for territories
- Fourth, the rejection of this initiative by Israel and the cold shoulder, it received from Henry Kissinger convinced Sadat, according to the Egyptian sources that diplomatic means were insufficient to break the deadlock and that war should be declared as soon as possible
- Finally as we know today, Israel's policy-makers' decision to reject the Egyptian proposal was taken despite their estimate that it would lead Egypt to declare war. In this sense, they consciously opted for war over peace

This particular war of 1973 was a historical one, it was the 4th Arab Israeli war in history. The war is popularly known as Yom Kippur in Israel while in the Arab world, it is known as the Ramadan war because the war broke out during the Muslim fasting period of Ramadan. It was at the beginning of the war that Anwar El-Sedat was reportedly saying:

> It is October 3d today and it is 4 in the afternoon. I believe that they will reveal the intention any moment from now and this is because the movement henceforth cannot leave any doubts in their minds as to the intentions. Even if they know tonight even if they decide to mobilize all their reserves and even if they think of launching a preemptive attack, they have lost the chance to catch us up (Herzog, 1975)

The Syrian fighters started the fight in September 1973 with an attack on Israeli planes about 12 were destroyed (Cohen and Gooch, 1990).

The aim of Egypt in the war was to fight the enemy after a long time preparation and re-enforcement of the army and bring back all occupied territories of the Arab (El-Badri *et al*., 1978).

Most of the reports of these episodes according to Benny, considered prime minister of Israel Golda Meir's reluctance to enter into negotiations which would have led to the return of the territories occupied in 1967, this however has led to the Egyptian war initiative of 1973.

Others, primarily Golda Meir herself and her close advisers, pinned the blame for the failure of diplomacy on what they regarded as the Egyptian refusal to reach peace with Israel (Gazit, 1983). The nature of entry into the war and exit is shown in Table 4. Syria suffered most of the casualties with about 8000 loss of its troops; Egypt and Iraq suffered the same number of losses after Syria with about 5000 losses each; Israel suffered 4000 loss of its troops and Jordan suffered the least with about 1000 losses.

Table 4: Entry and exit into the war of 1973

State	Entry	Exit	Combat forces	Population	Losses
Egypt	1973	1973	4,00,000	4,30,00,000	5000
Iraq	1973	1973	4,00,000	1,10,00,000	5000
Israel	1973	1973	2,00,000	42,00,000	4000
Jordan	1973	1973	60,000	17,50,000	1000
Syria	1973	1973	3,50,000	90,00,000	8000

Armed conflict events data base, 2000

Iran's experience with Iraq: The war lasted longer than both 1st and 2nd world war. It all started in 1980 and ended in 1988. It has caused lost of hundreds of human lives, millions of dollars, oil revenue and the worst was the application of chemical weapon. There is one common feature shared by both Iran and Iraq prior to the war. It was in 1979 that Saddam Hussein pressurized the country's incumbent president to resign and organized a meeting of the leadership of the Iraqi Ba'ath party during which his political opponents were apprehended and executed.

Similarly in 1979, Iran also experienced a revolution which was more fundamental than that that occurred in Iraq. Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, a modernizing pro-Western monarch was overthrown by a coalition of opponents who ranged across the ideological spectrum of Communists, Islamist radicals and others all worked to overthrow the Shah's government. After some months of scuffling over power, however Islamists led by the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini came to control Iran.

This had an enormous impact on the politics of the Middle East as Iran which under the Shah had been a close ally of both the United States and Israel became a bitter enemy of these two countries (Baylis, 2007). According to Baylis (2007), some of the factors that moved the two neighbors into the conflicts are fate of Iran's Khuzestan province and Iraqi access to the Persian Gulf; Iraqi mistrust of the new Iranian government, the personality of Saddam Hussein himself and his aggressiveness toward his neighbors. Another factor, however was the territorial dispute over the Shatt Al-Arab waterway. In the words of Baylis (2007):

> The dispute supposedly was settled by the 1975 Algiers Accord between the two countries but when the war began, Iraq revived its claims to complete control of the waterway. Unlike Iran which has a long coastline with a number of Persian Gulf ports, Iraq only has very limited access to the Gulf making the Shatt Al-Arab ec

Retrospectively speaking, Iran had a bitter relation with the United States immediately after the revolution which paved a room for the US to support Iraq even if Iraq was guilty. On the other hand similarly, Iraq was in a very good relation with the Soviet Union not until when Iraq went against the 1979 soviet invasion of Afghanistan (Baylis, 2007). In the spring of 1980, some Iranians attempted to kill the Iraqi foreign minister, a move that made Iraq so furious and increased suspicions of its neighbor. Consequently, the Iraqi government arrested and executed Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, a very prominent Iraqi Shia cleric who had publicly defended Iran's Islamic Revolution. The two parties broke off diplomatic relations in June; minor border clashes between Iraqi and Iranian troops also occurred. In September, the Iraqis first declared the Shatt Al-Arab waterway to be Iraqi territory and on the 22nd, invaded Iran. With the continuing invasion, however Iran strategized suicide bombing (Baylis, 2007).

According to Al-Marashi (2004) between 1983 and 1988 however, Iraq continued to use both mustard and nerve chemicals against Iranian troops without any international sanction. Similarly between February and March 1984, the Iraqis reportedly killed 40,000 Iranians and lost 9,000 of their own men in. In March 1985, Iranian forces reached fifteen miles from the strategic Baghdad-Basra highway.

If the Iranians had succeeded in that operation, it would have cut off the Iraqi capital from the Gulf and became a threat to Saddam. As a result, Iraq again unleashed chemical weapons against the Iranians. More than 100,000 Iranians have died due to Iraq's chemical weapons during the 8 years war. The CIA estimated in 1991 50,000 Iranian casualties from Iraq's use of several chemical weapons but it was later counted >100,000. However by April, 1988, casualties were estimated at between 450,000-730,000 Iranians dead and 150,000-340,000 Iraqis. It is however, considered one of the bloodiest wars in history including the American civil war and the 1st world war.

The possibility of military alliance: Just as what happened during the 1st world war, many Western countries supported Britain and France to fight Hitler there is possibility of forming military alliances between iron and Israel. It is likely that the United States continue to support Israel's act of terror in the Middle East especially Palestine and it is also likely that Russia will support Iran. China might back Iran together with Turkey and other few countries from the Middle East and developing countries. It is in line with this possibility that Liska (1968) opines that it is impossible to think of international relations without alliances. Military alliance is difficult to define within the realm of international



Fig. 1: The triangular concept term referent

relations and politics. Even in the argument of Fedder (1968), the concept of alliance in the literature of international relations is ambiguous and amorphous. Some of the major challenges of defining military alliance have moved scholars into writing about cooperation. Some times however, it depends on how the researcher wants to explain the extent and level of an alliance or cooperation. There is a triangular example of an alliance. It shows a dual alliance that deals with security agreement sometimes, the concept of alliance is interchangeably used as coalition, bloc or pact (Fig. 1).

Similarly, sometimes the concept of alliance could take entente, alignment, neutrality and non-aggression pact. However for Singer and Small (1966), alliance can be categorized into three; defense pacts, neutrality and non-aggression pacts and ententes. In another different literature (Holsti *et al*., 1973), there are three essentials of an alliance; a formal treaty open or secret, it must be directly concerned with national security issues and the partners must be nation-states. Walt (1987) gave the most significant description of alliance. He saw the concept as a formal or informal arrangement for security cooperation between two or more sovereign states. With the above theoretical explanation of the concept of alliance, it is obvious that the United States, Great Britain and France (three permanent members of the UN Security Council) are already in alliance with Israel. It is also obvious on the other hand that Iran may have an alliance with Russia, China, Turkey and other nation-states in the Middle East. The general characteristics of alliance therefore are:

- Alliances are arrangements between states
- Alliances are explicit agreements
- Alliances deal with a certain behavior for a certain contingency in the future
- It is essential that the event for which the specified behavior is promised is uncertain
- An alliance is a promise
- The promise comprises an assistance in the event specified in the treaty (usually an attack on one of the partners)
- The promise is a mutual one
- Last but not least, the agreement falls into the realm of national security

The Iran-Israeli military capability: Israel military expenditure as in 2009 was $13,001,000,000 and the percentage in GDP growth was 6.3%. On the other hand, however Iran's military expenditure of the same year was $7,044,000,000 while the percentage in GDP growth was 1.8%. This shows that the Israeli military expenditure of the year in question had almost doubled that of Iran. On the other hand, similarly the Israeli percentage of GDP growth was more than three times greater than that of Iran (Sharp, 2008).

However, the important point to consider here is that Israeli receives the highest defense aid from America more than any other country in the world and this started since after the 2nd world war. Israel was receiving $3 billion foreign defense aid from the US annually. After years of negotiation, the United States and Israel announced in August 2010 that Israel would purchase 20 F-35s at a cost of $2.75 billion which will be paid for entirely with FMF grants. The first planes are scheduled to be delivered in 2015, though the deal is still pending final approval by the Israeli cabinet (Sharp, 2008).

If not because of the support Israel has been getting from the United States, it would have been correct to argue that Israel would have not reached this hour. The previous Arab Israeli wars were just as it was America that fought them for Israel with support in military hard wares. In March, 2010, Obama Administration declared that it would support $205 million in defense assistance to Israel for the purchase of up to ten Iron Dome batteries. If passed, H.R. 5136, the National Defense Authorization bill for Fiscal year, 2011 would authorize the full $205 million for Israel's procurement of Iron Dome. The Senate's companion bill, S. 3454 also would authorize the full amount. In May, 2010 the house passed H.R. 5327, United States-Israel Rocket and Missile Defense Cooperation and Support Act which authorized the administration to provide assistance to the government of Israel for the procurement, maintenance and sustainment of the Iron Dome Short Range Artillery Rocket Defense system for purposes of intercepting short-range rockets, missiles and mortars launched against Israel. A Senate version of this bill, S. 3451 awaits floor action (Sharp, 2008).

Iran military capability: In the analysis of StrategyPage (2006), Israel could defeat Iran militarily in a

time of war. In his assertion not only counting on the defense aid that Israel gets from the United States, it has developed her own military technology to stand such competition. Some of the reasons, StrategyPage (2006) argues on are as follows:

- Israel has >200 atomic devices, Iran may have one soon. Even if Iran bought nuclear devices from other rogue states, the retaliation from Israel would be the equivalent of 2,000 plus Hiroshima's
- The 200 plus Israeli atomic devices is unstoppable by Iran that means upto 80 can be launched by submarines and the rest by ICBM or F-15s or F-16s
- Israel has the world's most advanced anti-ICBM missile umbrella which may be impenetrable by Iranian Shahib missiles. Iran may only deliver their 1-2 atomic warheads by ICBMs with no other delivery capabilities
- Israel has a satellite system with multiple types of spy satellites that have reached the limit of possible resolution (diffraction limit) generally thought to be about 10 cm and their satellite system is all weather. Together with their advanced UAV capabilities, this allows Israel to possess the most detailed photos and real-time imaging of all Iranian military installations
- The military technological difference between Israel and Iran is wide

Israel has about 10% of the worldwide arms export market which based solely on merit and immensely competitive. Iran sells nothing in worldwide arms market. Their highly publicized Shahib 3 missiles are nothing but a supped up version of the 63 years old V2 Nazi ballistic missile. Israel supplies Israeli developed military technology to most of the world's top militaries including the USA, India and China. China's J10 fighter is said to have been modeled after Israel's Lavi, the Israeli developed Jet fight (StrategyPage, 2006).

In terms of MBTs, Israel possesses 1500 consisting entirely of the modern highly regarded Merkava. Iran has approximately 500 all obsolete models including the T72. In front-line aircraft, Israel has approximately 800 with >500 being upgraded F15s and F16s. Israel also possesses in air refueling capabilities. Iran has about 250 front-line combat aircraft consisting mostly of obsolete older US and Russian fighters. It has no known in air refueling capability. Israel also is far ahead in production and use of UAVs and sells various models to many countries including Great Britain. There are other areas of military technology of which Israel is far more advanced than Iran (StrategyPage, 2006).



Fig. 2: The world's top five largest military budgets

Alliance and economic calculus: The assumption here lies under the possibility of any military alliance between the A and the B blocs what could be the economic calculus of such an alliance (Israel on one hand and Iran on the other). Figure 2 shows the strength of military spending by the permanent members of the UN security council. Based on the first assumption made as Russia and China (the two as permanent members of the UN Security Council) give their support to Iran in times of war with Israel how effective could that help be? If such an event occurs that means an army supported by $150 billion dollars will support Iran. However definitely, the rest of the three would support Israel which means an army supported by $790 billion will fight an army supported by $150 billion dollars. The disparity is large indeed. Accordingly, even if we assume the four permanent members (China, France, UK and Russia for example) should support Iran, the four combined do not stand the military capability of the United States. This is tantamount to $700 billion dollars supported army against $240 dollar's. The result is defeating Israel would appear to be a mirage.

CONCLUSION

From the earlier analysis and results of this study, it is correct to argue that Iran position it self in an independent power circle not to be controlled by a foreign power (especially the West), against the wishes of the West for their call on non-proliferation. However, the argument is they allow no country to develop nuclear armament but they continue to have it and even secretly developing it. This however, shows the relevance of the realist gesture in explaining what happens in the

relationships of nation-states. It is also obvious that Israel is under the complete support and protection of the United States and other western powers. Any form of military alliance between any country(ies) in the world and Iran may not beat US-Israeli alliance even in a state of war.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In order to avoid international anarchy and polarization of countries based on regional, religious or ideological connotations; the following recommendations are useful to the rising military temper within the Middle East as well as among allies of those states in question:

- The long lasting peace impasse between Israel and Palestine has to be solved impartially with a particular consideration to the yearnings of Palestinians (two state solutions)
- The United States of America has to decrease the level of military aid, it gives to Israel and condition Israel to be a peace-loving nation
- The world super powers have to lead by example by destroying their weapons of mass destruction to encourage weaker nations not to develop such instruments of human obliteration
- Iran should not be made an outcast or forced to terminate its nuclear program if it does not go contrary to the standards of IAEA
- China must develop her military industrial complex along side with Russia, India and Brazil, etc., to form a new team of power balancer in international politics. This will discourage monopoly of power by the United States and other EU and NATO member states

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