TY  - JOUR
T1  - Audit Firms-Clients Relationships: A Socio-Economic Theory Perspective
AU - Mahdavi, Gholam Hossein AU - Daryaei, Abbas Ali 
JO  - International Business Management
VL  - 10
IS  - 22
SP  - 5387
EP  - 5396
PY  - 2016
DA  - 2001/08/19
SN  - 1993-5250
DO  - ibm.2016.5387.5396
UR  - https://makhillpublications.co/view-article.php?doi=ibm.2016.5387.5396
KW  - Socio-economic theory
KW  -audit firm
KW  -client
KW  -audit fee
KW  -Iran
AB  - Emphasizing the game theory and exchange theory, this study is seeking to justify auditors and clients’ types of behaviors with respect to Socio-Economic theory. The most important issue, influencing this relationship is the audit fee. According to the Walrasian stability, many factors such as client size, complexity of company operations, type of auditing, institutional investors ownership, managers ownership, inflation etc are specified by the balanced audit fee. According to sequential rationality and signaling game in auditing, it was also shown that the signals sent by auditors and clients, resulting from their strategies would have important roles in their balance type. Finally, the payoff matrix was employed to determine the optimum level of audit fee. It was indicated that an optimum level could be determined in accordance with auditor-client strategies.
ER  -